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3. SOUND AND EVENTS
The philosophical analysis of sound comes up against general  
problems of metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of mind,  
because of the decisions it is expected to make concerning the  
nature and properties of sounds, as well as about the conditions in  
which  our  knowledge  of  sounds  takes  form;  and,   moreover, 
because sounds are perceptual objects, and philosophy of perception 
is a fundamental branch of the philosophy of mind.  As we have 
shown  in  the  context  of  the  distinction  between  sensory  
modalities, decisions in one of these philosophical domains are  
not without consequence for the other domains.
The object of the present chapter is the metaphysical theory of  
sounds.  We will  first  tackle  the  problem of  the  metaphysical 
categorization of sounds, and we will suggest that sounds should  
be considered events.  Secondly, we will examine the relationship 
between this kind of event and the rest of the physical world, by  
tightly associating sounds to the objects that produce them.
3.1 Sounds are not qualities
The  first  general  problem  concerns  the  categorization  of  
sounds.   The relevant  question is:   what  is  the category that  
sounds belong to, what kind of entities are sounds?
According to a well-established tradition, sounds are qualities  
(or properties) of objects.  In fact, each object is associated with a 
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typical  sound:  birds  of  different  species  sing  with  different 
voices, machines and artifacts each produce a distinctive sound.  
However, if we consider the paradigmatic case of quality:  color – 
which is also typically related to objects – we will see that color  
stands in a totally different relation to objects than sound.   While 
passive objects still have color, sounds are specifically related to  
objects that are somehow active.  Thus, the presence of sounds 
testifies that something is going on, an event, and the object is the  
source  of  this  event:  its  actor  or  victim.  If  we must  indicate 
something that, in the field of audition, belongs to the category of  
qualities, it would be sonority:  a particular disposition of objects 
to produce sounds.
However, classifying sounds as qualities gives rise to a difficulty:  
if sounds are qualities, then they are dynamic qualities, qualities  
that change over time; but the ordinary concept of quality rather  
applies  to  static  entities. It  is  also  possible  that  no  definitive 
objection  exists  against  the  concept  of  dynamic  qualities.   A. 
Quinton (1979), for instance, claims that sounds are examples of  
individual or particular qualities, C.D. Williams (1953) calls them 
tropes,  and  E.  Husserl  moments  (1900-1901,  Third  logical  
investigation)moments.  By considering events as tropes, the thesis 
that we are going to defend in this book (that sounds are events)  
becomes  compatible  with  the  traditional  position  according  to  
which sounds are qualities.
Not only have sounds been considered as qualities, they have  
also  been  classified  as  subjective  or  secondary  qualities  (as  
opposed to objective  or  primary qualities).   Broadly  speaking, 
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secondary  qualities  depend  on  the  characteristics  of  the  
perceiving subject, while primary qualities are independent from  
perception (see chap. 11).  The thesis that sounds are qualities, in 
fact,  is  often  justified  on  the  grounds  of  the  assimilation  of  
sounds  to  mind-dependent  entities.   The  ordinary  concept  of 
sound is certainly grounded on sensory bases, sounds are mostly  
considered as audible things, and those who consider audibility as  
an essential character of sounds are also ready to consider sounds  
as subjective qualities.  The strong version of this thesis identifies  
sounds with acoustic sensations (this is a commonplace for the  
modern psychology of perception, starting from Helmholtz 1863,  
1990; see Hacker, 1987:  chap. 2 and 3).  This thesis is exposed to  
counter-intuitive  consequences,  such  as  the  fact  that  different 
persons could never hear the same sound.
3.2. Events
We have seen above that the presence of a sound manifests  
the presence of an  event.  The world’s  dynamic character  thus 
makes its appearance in the domain of acoustic perception.   But 
the  link  between  sounds  and  events  is  clearly  extremely  tight, 
stronger than a simple relation of bearing witnessAccording to the  
thesis that we will defend, sounds are events.
We  hear  objects  and  we  see  them. But  when  audition  is 
involved the most natural and perspicuous objects of perception  
are  events.  Moreover,  in  language,  sounds  are  categorized  as 
events.  I.e.,  when describing objects’  shape and color  (and in 
general  terms:  their  properties)  we  normally  use  the  structure  
copula + adjective (as in:  “the table is red”), but when speaking of 
events we use verbal constructions (John  runs), or verbal nouns 
(John’s run). It is a fact that sentences about the sound dimension  
of the world have an event-like structure:  we say that the car roars  
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(verbal construction), and we speak of the roaring of a car (verbal  
noun construction).
Moreover, we learn from acoustics ( a branch of physics) that 
sounds should not be considered as objects’ properties, the likes of 
colors or geometric shapes, but that they should be assigned to a  
special  class  of  entities:   the  class  of  waves  or  periodic  
perturbations,  a  class  which  certainly  shares  affinities  with  the 
category of events. “A periodic perturbation, called sound wave... 
crosses  air.  When it  reaches  the  ear,  we  perceive  this  periodic 
wave as a sound having a determined musical pitch” (Pierce 1983: 
20).                                            
                                                Sound  =  sound wave
It must be noticed that the reference to periodicity is too narrow for  
a general definition of sounds:  a sudden explosion will produce  
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one and only one wave front, which propagates through the air  
without any periodic repetition.  A wave front consists in the 
compression of a medium which moves from a source.
The movement of  the  front  can be considered as the  sound  
event.   So, if we identify waves with the movement of the front,  
then sounds can be considered as waves.   This description does 
not imply that waves move from one place to another: waves are 
the movement of  wave fronts.   (The description  looks circular. 
However a wave front can be described in terms that do not make  
use of the concept of a wave; i.e., in the case of sea waves, the  
front  will  be  defined  in  terms  of  a  sudden  change  of  the  sea  
surface’s slant.)
3.3 Waves: the Classical Theory
Traditional physicalism (correctly) refuses to consider sounds 
as qualities, and identifies sounds with sound waves in a medium  
which includes a resonant object and (maybe also) a hearer.  We 
will call this approach the Classic al Theory.  The identification 
of sounds with sound waves in a medium raises objections and  
leaves a number of problems unsolved.   Firstly, it is difficult to 
frame with precision the content of the physicalist thesis.  
 Physics, has a well-defined branch dealing witht he mechanical  
vibrations of solid bodies, fluids and gases.  Acoustics is 
considered as a sub-field of this branch.  It can, for example,  
provide definitions such as the following:
“Sounds  are  oscillations  or  vibrations  in  the  range  of  
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frequencies  between  16Hz  et  20kHz,  that  is,  the  range  
human hearing is sensitive to” (see Blauert1983:  2; Hertz,  
Hz, measures the number of events per second).
Nonetheless, it is also very common to broaden this range, so  
as to include so-called infrasounds and ultrasounds and to obtain  
the full range of mechanical vibrations.   The justification for this 
operation  comes  from the  difficulty  of  distinguishing  between 
audible  and  non-audible  vibrations,  the  reference  to  audibility  
being totally extrinsic to acoustics.   In which case, the correct 
definition would be:  “vibrations, some of which are audible”.
3.4 Waves and events
There  exist  two  main  metaphysical  conceptions  concerning  
waves  (we  are   dealing  generically  with  perturbations  in  an 
ambient  medium, thus including non periodic perturbations that,  
strictly speaking, are not waves).  Let us suppose that sound waves 
share the same nature of processes and events.  In this case, sound 
waves cannot move from one place to another since, if we accept  
an argument by Fred Dretske (1967), processes and events do not.  
The argument runs as follows:  consider a dancing party starting, at 
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dawn, in  Sardinia;  at  midday participants decide to move to  an  
island close to Sardinia, so the party continues in Corsica, where it  
ends in the evening.  We could say that the party has moved from 
Sardinia to Corsica, and this consideration would justify the idea  
that events can move from one place to another.  But according to 
Dretske, this idea is not correct because the party was never wholly 
in  Sardinia  or  in  Corsica.  A  part  or  phase  of  the  party,  the 
beginning, took place in Sardinia, while another part, the end, took  
place in Corsica.  For an entity to move from A to B, the entity 
must totally occupy A first, and then B.  As a consequence, if we 
believe that waves in a medium are processes and that processes do  
not  move from one place  to  another,  then we must  reformulate  
certain theses concerning the nature of sounds.   For convenience’s 
sake, we will sometimes refer to sound waves as something that  
moves from one place to another, but we must keep aware that this 
formula is not perfectly suitable because, in reality, sound waves do 
not move but the different spatio-temporal segments of the wave  
are located in different places at different times.
3.5 Sounds and sound waves
We are going to consider some important arguments in favor 
of the Classic Theory according to which sounds are sound waves  
in a medium.  These arguments raise a set of objections that we 
will exploit in order to formulate what we believe is the correct 
analysis of the nature of sounds.
“Sounds  are  sometimes  loud  and  sometimes  low.  We  can 
distinguish between loud sounds that come from afar (S) and low  
sounds, (S’), that come from close  because they have a different  
Casati Dokic Philosophy of Sound (1994) Chapter  3   8/ 15
intensity; however, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between 
S and S’ because all sound waves in the medium (corresponding to 
S and S’ respectively) can have the same intensity in the space 
close to our ears.  Hence it is natural to identify sounds with sound 
waves  in  a  medium”.   In  fact,  the  identity  of  wave  intensities  
explains the fact that it is not possible to distinguish S from S’.  
However, the  indiscernability of S and S’ can also be explained 
without identifying sounds with waves. Two sounds that cannot be 
distinguished can remain distinct.  In other words, a loud sound 
heard at distance, is still loud, even if the amplitude of the related  
waves in the medium is reduced.  So, something that characterizes  
waves in a medium does not characterize sounds, and this is an  
argument in favor of the distinction between sounds and waves.
Consider another classical argument in favor of the identity of 
sounds and sound waves.  A tuning-fork vibrates in a vacuum-jar  
in which a void has been created.   When air is introduced into the 
jar we hear a sound; when the jar is emptied and is void, we no  
longer hear any sound (let us bracket out the fact that the presence  
of air can influence the vibration of the tuning-fork).   But could 
we  say  that  the  tuning-fork’s  vibration  starts  and  stops  in 
correspondence with the presence or absence of air?   The case 
produces divergent intuitions, but it is reasonable to describe the  
situation as follows:  independently from the presence or absence  
of air, the tuning-fork continues to resonate, but the sound of the 
tuning-fork  is  sometimes  audible  and  sometimes  it  is  not  (in  
correspondence with the absence of the medium that is required in  
order to transmit  sound information).   Of course,  if  sounds are 
sound waves in an ambient  medium, then we are compelled to  
accept  that  the  tuning  fork  intermittingly  starts  and  stops 
producing sound.
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Analogies with vision can help to clarify our position.  Let us 
first consider an object in the dark.  The fact of illuminating the 
object,  and  of  taking  away  light  from  it,  would  be  hardly 
described as identical to creating the object’s colors, but rather, as 
the  fact  of  revealing  them,  of  bringing  them  to  light.   This 
description  reminds  us  of  a  phenomenon,  well-known  to  
psychologists,  which  is  called  the  tunnel  effect. Let  us  see  a 
second example.  If a black circle shifts from left to right behind  
a  white  screen,  and  reappears  in  the  right  part  of  the  screen,  
nobody  will  think  that  there  are  two  circles  (the  first  one,  
disappearing to the left, and the second, reappearing on the right  
of the screen), but one and the same circle which, for a while, is  
hidden. You have the impression of witnessing one and the same 
event,  which  corresponds  to  the  uninterrupted,  and  partially  
hidden, shifting of a circle.
                           Sound                                 Sound wave
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A third example of tunnel effect, that we could label “fridge 
effect”  runs  as  follows:  when  one  opens  the  door  of  one’s 
refrigerator a lamp is automatically switched on; however, one 
could  be  under  the  impression  that  the  lamp  in  the  fridge  is  
constantly switched on, even before one opens the fridge.
Of course, the sensation connected to the tunnel effect can be  
illusory.  Nonetheless,  its  existence  suggests  that  ordinary 
phenomenology  includes the notion of non-perceived existence 
of qualities such as colors, of objects such as circles, as well as of  
events  such  as  the  movement  of  the  circle.  The  ordinary 
phenomenology of auditory perception does not seem to be an  
exception.  One would not say that, because of a modification in  
the listening conditions, what one was listening too has changed;  
i.e.,  one  is  capable  of  distinguishing between listening  a  poor  
execution of a piece of music and the execution of a piece of  
music in poor listening conditions.   Similarly, owing to the fact 
that  the  tuning-fork  is  vibrating  in  poor  listening  conditions  
(because of the suppression of the ambient medium), one is not  
prepared to assert that the tuning-fork is not vibrating.
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3.6 The Event theory
The mainstream theory of sounds, and the claim that sounds  
are perturbations that happen in the ambient  medium, fail  s to 
take into account the possibility that sounds are perturbations that  
happen  to  a  certain  type  of  object.   We  propose  to  consider 
sounds as events that happen in the resonant object, and we call  
our approach “Event Theory”.  For the moment, we will not focus 
our interest on the question of whether these events are waves.  
The  main  point  that  we  want  to  stress  is  that  sounds  involve  
primarily the space occupied by the resonant object , even if, in 
most cases, the presence of a medium is required for acquiring  
perceptual information about the sound.
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 Thanks to the identification of sounds with events it is possible to 
deal in a satisfactory way with those feaures of sounds that create  
problems in other theories.  Like sounds, sound perturbations that 
happen in the object do not move in the environment from one  
place to another.  Like sounds, sound perturbations do not 
propagate from the object to the subject’s ears. In contrast to sound 
waves in a medium, and like sounds, the intensity of perturbations  
can remain constant through time.
Finally,  the  consideration that  tuning-forks  and other  vibrating 
objects resonate independently from their immersion in a medium  
is  compatible  with  our  theory:   we  do  not  create  sounds  by  
putting objects in a medium, we reveal them.
The  Event  Theory,  and  the  identification  of  sounds  with 
events, has an immediate and important consequence:  it provides  
a perspicuous example of the compatibility between an indirect  
theory of perception and a theory which gives up mental entities  
such as sense data.    Perception can be indirect without mental 
intermediates:  we hear cars and telephones when we hear their  
sound, that is, when we hear events that happen to the objects.  
Sounds are physical entities and perceptual intermediates at the  
same time.
3.7. Sounds and ultrasounds
The Event Theory and the Classical Theory are both variants 
of physicalism, and, as a consequence, they must deal with the  
following  problem:   the  ordinary  concept  of  sounds  seems  to  
imply that sounds are audibilia, that sounds must be perceptible, 
audible,  entities.  According to the ordinary concept of sound,  
then,  ultrasounds  (and  of  course,  infrasounds)  are  not  sounds.  
For  critics  of  physicalism   who  believe  that  sounds  have  a  
phenomenal  nature,  it  is  impossible  to  escape  this  conclusion,  
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because it stems, analytically, from the definition of sound.  In 
contrast, physicalists will say that the ordinary concept of sound  
should be revised and a theoretical definition (which is opposed  
to a conceptual analysis; see section 1.5) should be provided.   A 
theoretical  definition  of  sound,  which  would  be  in  line  with  
physicalism,  would,  however,  claim  that  even  if  sounds  have 
phenomenal  qualities,  these  qualities  are  not  essential  to  their  
definition  (chap.  11).  So,  if  ultrasounds  share  the  essential 
qualities of sounds, physicalists will claim that ultrasounds can be  
included  into  an  extended  theoretical  concept  of  sound.  
However,  physicalists  will  not  be  forced  to  claim  that  the 
ordinary concept of sound (which includes the characteristic of  
being audible)  is  not  coherent:  they will  say that  the  ordinary  
concept is suitable for designating a relevant part of the class of  
sounds, the part constituted by audible sounds.
Appendix: Sound theories in the philosophical and  
psychological tradition 
In this Appendix we will briefly present paradigmatic theories  
of  sound,  in  order  to  show analogies  and differences  between  
them, as well as how they contrast with Event Theory.
Urmson
J.O.  Urmson  (1968:   119-121)  highlights  the  following 
analogies between sounds and material  objects;  (1)  sounds are 
individuals and can be counted; (2) they have a finite duration,  
like  material  objects;  (3)  they  are  threedimensional  and  have  
boundaries; (4). they can move, together with the resonant object,  
or independently from the object, as exemplified by echoes.  But, 
(5). sounds are different from material objects because they are  
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not impenetrable.   The Event Theory we propose accepts 1., 2.,  
and 5., but rejects 3. And 4.
Hacker
Hacker (1987: 100 sqq.) shares Urmson’s assertions 2. and 5., 
but  rejects  1,  3.  and  4.: “Sounds,  however,  are  not  three-
dimensional objects”  they have no spatial dimension, and «The 
movement of sound … must not be confused with the movement  
of sound waves ” However, “we conceive of sound more or less  
`under the aspect' of an object, not of a wave” ,  and the case of 
the  echo is  well  and  truly  that  of  a  sound that  moves  and is  
perceived as moving (this last point is denied by Event Theory).
Blauert
Blauert’s text  of  1974  (re-published  1983)  is  a  reference  for 
theories of spatial localization of sounds.  The text opens with a 
distinction between sound events and auditory events (pp. 2-4),  
auditory  events  being  the  supposed  objects  of  auditory  
experiences (which can subsist in absence of sound events).  This  
characterization  introduces  an  ontological  distinction  between  
two kinds  of  sounds:   world  sounds  and perceptual  sounds,  a  
form of dualism rejected by the Event Theory.
Helmholtz
In his Physiological theory of music (1863, 1990), Helmholtz  
presents two ideas, both opposed to the Event Theory under two  
different aspects:  sounds as sound waves belong to acoustics in  
physics, while sounds as acoustic sensations belong to acoustics  
in psychology.
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Gibson
Psychologist J. J. Gibson repeatedly describes his theory as a  
form of direct realism.  We could thus expect his theory to be 
close to the Event Theory.  Indeed, most of the reasons that are 
invoked here in defense of the Event Theory are inspired by so-
called  ecological  acoustics,  which  triesto  specify  the  kind  of 
entities that are present in the sound environment and according  
to which perception takes its bearings.  In fact, Gibson (1966: 87) 
accepts that the objects of hearing are events; nonetheless, and in  
contrast with Event Theory, he identifies sounds with vibrations 
in a medium.  Gibson’s position has been developed by Handel 
(1989, chap. 6).
